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The pressures of a changing business environment have resulted in new rules for strategic 
price decisions in the food and agribusiness sector.  The proliferation of biotechnology methods 
results in an increasing rate of innovation and new product introduction.  New products, once 
introduced, are rapidly replaced by competitive innovation, making obsolete the existing products and 
requiring the introduction of new or modified ones (Cooper, 1993).  While not predicted with 
certainty, one of the indirect effects is to shorten the product life cycle of the biotechnology-derived 
products.  Thus, it is of critical importance to develop and maintain a proper pricing strategy over 
time.    Furthermore, many firms introducing biotechnology-derived products do so as an extension of 
an existing product line in order to serve new market niches.   
However, competitors are not willing to stand by idly as their markets are invaded.  Monroe 
(1990) observes: “Technological progress has reduced the average life of the products.  Thus, a new 
product does not have much time to become profitable, and any pricing mistakes made during the 
introduction will diminish potential profitability (p.8)”.  The pricing strategy may be altered by 
competitors’ responses in non-price marketing efforts.  Therefore, pricing new and existing products 
has become more critical than ever. 
This paper aims to analytically evaluate the time paths of pricing a portfolio of seeds, which 
simultaneously address the goal of encouraging adoption and maximizing a firm’ returns within a 
competitive environment while considering shorter life cycles.  Specifically, this paper provides 
analytical answers to the following two research questions:  
1.  How does a seed firm prefer to price a competing set of seeds?  Does the optimal pricing time 
path for a single product change when a portfolio of competing products is considered? 
2.  How does competitive uncertainty in the form of farmer’s response and non-price marketing 
effort affect the resulting pricing time paths of the competing products?   2 
Problem Setting 
  In the agriculture sector, product improvement is often associated with the emergence 
of biotechnology techniques.  Katz (1996) describes biotechnology as a series of tools that are useful 
in providing foods sources that fit current needs.  Biotechnology offers the opportunity for marketing 
channel participants to be focused on customer demands by providing a large set of improved and 
differentiated products targeting specific and well-identified food market niches. Within the present 
research, biotechnology is a broad term, which encompasses a wide spectrum of techniques from 
identifying and selecting for naturally occurring genetic traits (e.g. gene markers) through direct 
manipulation of the genome (genetically modified organisms or GMOs).  No specific biotechnology 
technique is inferred.   
As customers’ needs are continuously changing, input producers as well as output producers 
adapt their production systems to that change in order to develop and improve their products 
accordingly.  Participants compete on the basis of customer’s satisfaction; they are continuously 
searching for the best marketing tools for competitive advantage.  Thus, competition among them 
shortens the life cycle of new products, but by an uncertain amount.  By the same token, it is 
commonly believed that biotechnology-derived products, once introduced, do not have as long of a 
market life cycle as in years past. 
Given the competitive environment, the uncertainty of product life cycle, and the investment 
in biotechnology, a producer of biotechnology-derived products is faced with the simultaneous goals 
of 1) recovering substantial investment, 2) facilitating the adoption of new (biotech) products and 3) 
optimizing returns from the product portfolio supplied to the market.  Therefore, synchronized pricing 
of new and existing products has become more critical than ever.  Errors by suppliers in pricing new 
products may result in failure to provide sufficient returns above development costs, either through 
failure to obtain an adequate margin or through failure to obtain adequate volume.   
For theoretical and analytical purposes, the investigation focuses on the seed industry for the 
following three reasons.  First, the rapid change in the seed industry is associated with changes in the   3 
market.  Second, the measurement of the success of a seed has shifted from yield per acre to dollars 
earned per acre because of quality differentials (Engelke, 1997) and associated price of the output. 
Third, the seed industry is characterized by an oligopolistic supply situation where participants 
compete not by reducing seed prices, but by expending more money in sales promotion and scientific 
research (Ducos, 1987).  Also, with the introduction of the biotechnology-derived seeds, seed firms 
face competition from other producers of farm inputs whose inputs are substitutes for biotechnology-
derived seed characteristics
1.    
The seed portfolio consists of an existing corn seed and two biotechnology-derived corn 
seeds (a cost-lowering input-trait and a value enhanced output-trait) whose characteristics are valued 
by target-users within the same market.  Input-trait and output-trait corn seeds are derived from the 
use of biotechnology techniques.  With input-trait corn seed, the set of inputs necessary to grow the 
plant is altered.  However, with output-trait seed, the chemical composition of the output is different 
from regular corn.    
With the introduction of biotechnology-derived corn seeds, farmers have the opportunity to 
grow all the seeds for the same and/or specific market.  Farmers grow input-trait corn seeds to satisfy 
participants’ needs in the market served by the regular corn seeds but at lower cost. At the same time, 
farmers grow the output-trait corn seed for a specific customer (e.g.: poultry feed) in the corn market.  
Poultry participants may specify directly or indirectly to the farmer the type of seed they want in 
order to get the desired qualities.  This situation implies a willingness to provide some incentives, 
either through price or other financial means, to farmers in order to motivate their participation.   This 
paper ignores recent developments in US marketing channels resulting from the European trade 
environment concerning genetically modified products.   
The poultry industry is the set of potential customers for the output-trait corn seed in this 
study because of the importance of corn in the broiler diet (Han et al., 1987; Adams et al., 1994; 
                                                 
1 The term “biotechnology-derived seed” is used to identify plant genetic material whose characteristics have 
been altered through the use of biotechnology techniques.   4 
Wright and Morgan, 1996; Duldley-Cash, 1997).  This research considers a conventional corn seed, 
Bt corn seed, and high-oil corn seed
2.  The use of Bt corn seed and high-oil corn, for example, allows 
farmers and poultry participants to reduce other input costs by applying less pesticides chemicals for 
the former and less supplemental fat ingredients in broiler diets for the latter.  However, pesticide 
producers as well as supplemental fat producers may retaliate through price reduction in order to 
make these seeds less valuable.  In this case, the competition that faces the seed firm comes from 
within the seed industry as well as from other producers of farm inputs whose inputs are substitutes 
for biotechnology-derived seed characteristics.  Thus, it is important to analytically examine the 
sensitivity of the preferred pricing time paths with respect to market changes, potential competitive 
reactions, and shortened product life cycle. 
 
Literature Review 
There exist extensive theoretical and empirical works on pricing models within generalized 
competitive and/or noncompetitive markets.  Several of them emphasize the single-pricing pricing 
case where a single product is supplied in the market.  While the situation fits the assumptions of 
different models, it might not be appropriate in the case where more than one product is supplied by 
one firm in the same market.  When a firm produces several goods, the problem faced is to set a 
portfolio pricing strategy that maximizes the firm’s profits.   
Urban (1969) analyzes an a priori product line model for finding the best marketing mix for 
each product.  Brand interdependency is tested through direct and cross-price elasticity and sensitivity 
of three marketing variables (price, promotion and place).  Through cross-price elasticity, he finds 
evidence of complementarity interactions between brands despite their substitution functions.   Mussa 
and Rosen’s (1978) analysis on product line pricing shows that a monopolist provides products of 
different quality to capture consumer surplus.  Little and Shapiro (1980) theoretically show that cross-
                                                 
2 Within this research, regular corn seed, input-trait corn seed, and output-trait corn seed refer to conventional 
corn seed, Bt corn seed, and high-oil corn seed, respectively.    5 
elasticities, elasticities, margins, and demand determine the optimal price.  Oren et al. (1984) analyze 
product line pricing for a firm within a competitive setting assuming no reaction from rivals when a 
firm sets its prices.  Moorthy and Png (1992) examine the product line-pricing problem with the 
assumption that a monopolist introduces the products sequentially instead of simultaneously.  
Kadiyali et al. (1996) extend the product line-pricing problem within a duopolistic setting where a 
firm prices its products taking in account its rival’s reaction.  Their empirical test on firms selling 
laundry detergent proves that a leader-follower strategy is an option when pricing different products.    
These different studies related to product line pricing consider a simple market structure to 
analyze the pricing problem faced by a firm supplying many products.  These studies consider some 
variables of the marketing mix. With the introduction of biotechnology-derived seeds, a seed firm 
faces farmers’ acceptance and competitive reaction from within the industry and outside the industry 
as explained earlier.  This study extends the product portfolio problem within a competitive setting by 
modeling a three-step competition variable. The first competitive variable incorporates the different 
benefits provided by each type of seed.  The second competitive variable incorporates a marketing 
mix ratio, which depicts the relative value of the non-price competition strategies (place and 
promotion).   The third competitive variable evaluates the reaction of the other farm input producers 
whose market is likely affected by seed producers.  The representative seed firm simultaneously 
supplies both existing and improved seed varieties, which target the same well-defined market 
segments. 
With the continuous market changes, pricing strategies as modeled here stress the importance 
of value or benefits that the product provides to customers.  Price is associated with the notion of 
perceived value
3.  Morris and Morris (1990) depict perceived value in terms of low price as well as 
benefits received such as improved quality or unique quality traits.  Hence, a higher perceived value 
presupposes a willingness to buy the product; otherwise customers search for alternative brands 
(Martins, 1993).   
                                                 
3 For more detail see Thomas Nagle (1997) and Michael Marn (1997).   6 
Variable costs of production for the three seed varieties are assumed to be equal. Given the 
changing characteristic of the seed market that is reflected by farmers’ and grain users’ attitudes 
toward different seed varieties and the resulting objective of maximizing the firm’s revenues, this 
study intends to provide seed producers with useful insights on specific factors influencing the pricing 
strategy of a portfolio of competing seeds for a given planning horizon.  Dynamic programming (DP) 
is an appealing method because seed producers will be able to identify the time paths of these 
influencing factors and the resulting time path of preferred price from the beginning to the end of the 
planning horizon.   
 
Adoption Behavior of the Decision Maker 
Farmers as well as grain’s users search for profit as well efficiency in their production 
operations when adopting a specific seed variety.  Their attitude toward a seed’s attributes will differ 
with respect to seed varieties.   
For regular corn seed, the purchase decision is based on its yield performance given the fact 
that each farmer is a price taker in the farm input and output markets.  A positive change in corn yield 
implies an increase in farm revenue assuming unchanged other variables (other related farm inputs).  
However, yield improvement depends on the environmental conditions under which the corn is 
grown.    Besides the yield improvement, the purchase of the regular corn seed is also related to corn 
price.  A change in the price of corn may affect a farmer’s purchase decisions.  Corn price impacts the 
size of acreage allocated to grow corn.  Farmers’ response is incorporated through “output price 
elasticity”, which measures the change in acreage with respect to corn price change. The direct 
impacts of yield improvement are not incorporated in the model. 
The input-trait corn seed targets the same corn market but it presents the unique additional 
advantage of reducing input cost at the farm level.  In this case, the farmer’s adoption decision 
depends on the expected net revenue from using the input-trait corn seed.  If the expected return (net 
profit) from using the input-trait corn seed exceeds the expected return (net profit) from using the   7 
regular corn seed, the adoption of the input-trait seed is possible.  Assuming that other farm input 
costs remain unchanged, the change in the farmer’s returns can occur through either a change in the 
corn price, a reduction of other input cost (pesticide costs), or a positive change in seed performance 
(reduced risk of losing crops).  If a farmer believes that the input-trait is able to withstand some 
environment conditions that provoke yield loss, the adoption of the input-trait corn seed is possible.  
Thus, a farmer adopts the seed if he/she expects a better yield distribution.  Let  R g be the corn yield 
per acre from using regular corn seed and  I g  corn yield from using input-trait corn seed.  The 
conditions of adoption are  
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where: 
I
s w   : is the price of input-trait corn seed, 
R
s w   : is the price of regular corn seed, 
I s   : indicates the quantity of input-trait corn seed for a given unit of land, 
R s   : indicates the quantity of regular corn seed for a given unit of land,   
p w   : is the price of pesticide, whose trait is incorporated into the seed, 
I p   : indicates the amount of pesticide applied when input-trait corn seed is used, 
R p   : indicates the amount of pesticide applied when regular corn seed is used. 
This research is concerned with the first moment conditions.   
Assuming the same corn price, the cost saving is the factor motivating the adoption/purchase 
of the input-trait seed.  Farmer’s attitude for the cost saving associated with the input-trait corn seed is 
incorporated through a substitution effect variable. 
   8 
The use of output-trait corn seed (high-oil corn seed) presents many benefits depending on 
the users’ needs.  Farmers grow high-oil corn to meet the specific needs of poultry growers.  One of 
the benefits is the cost savings associated with the use of output-trait corn seed such as replacing 
expensive ration ingredients and increasing ration energy while adding less supplemental fats in most 
cases because of high nutrient density provided by corn grain.  At the farm level, these benefits are 
translated in terms of financial incentives for potential farmers’ participation, specifically in terms of 
premiums.  The producer premiums are based on the oil content.  Premiums paid range between $0.05 
and $0.25 under harvest delivery contract and between $0.10 and $0.30 under a buyer’s call contract 
(U.S. Grains Council, 1999).  These incentives may come from poultry growers or seed firms, 
depending on the type of coordination.  Poultry growers decide the high oil corn need based on the 
potential cost saving.  The amount of substitution between high oil, regular corn, and supplemental 
fats that occurs drives contracted incentives or premiums.  This research assumes a simple 
coordination, which consists of contractual agreements between farmers and poultry growers, and no 
involvement of the seed firm.  We use an acreage (high oil acreage) response to the premium as an 
adopting variable for the output-trait corn seed.    
Seed firms expect to sell product every growing season.  The demand of each seed variety at 
time t consists of new customers and repeats (number of acres allocated to a specific seed variety).  
The purchasing decision is based on the benefits that each seed variety provides to the users.  Within 
the competitive setting and with a profit maximization objective, the benefits of a specific seed 
variety should outweigh the benefits provided by alternative seeds in order to be adopted.  It is 
important to note that the target of output-trait corn seed is not directly the farmer but poultry 
growers.  Any changes in the economics of poultry production might influence farmers’ decisions to 
grow the output-trait corn seed.   If high-oil corn (from output-trait corn seeds) provides a higher 
input cost saving to poultry growers, they might be willing to increase their demand and at the same 
time the increase of incentives (premium) to farmers.   
   9 
The Model  
  To address the research objectives, we use a dynamic programming approach.  One of the 
benefits of the DP model is its ability to identify an optimal pricing strategy under a range of 
conditions through parametric variations of state variables.  The DP model is based on Bellman’s 
Principle of Optimality, which consists of decomposing one-T period optimization problem into T 
connected, one-period optimization problems (Taylor and Duffy, 1994).  The research model is based 
on the following assumptions: 
1.   The seed firm and the farmer are profit-maximizers. 
2.  Farmers respond to output-trait premiums and inputs costs by adjusting acres allocated to 
each corn variety. 
3.  Adoption is related to the benefits provided by each corn seed variety. 
4.  Seed firm relies on farmer’s learning curve. 
5.  Biotechnology-derived corn seeds (input-trait and output-trait) and hybrid corn seeds 
target the same market. 
6.  The unit variable cost of producing any type of seed is not materially different. 
7.  A fixed adopting market size is considered. 
8.  Farmers are price-takers in both input and output markets. 
The objective of the representative seed firm that supplies a competing set of seed varieties in 
the market is to maximize its portfolio returns over a T-period time horizon.  The objective function is 
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where:   10 
) ( t s V   : present value of discounted returns given a vector of state variables at time t, 
t s   : value of state variables at time t, 
t R   : one period return at time t, 
i
t d   : number of acres allocated to a seed type i at time t, 
M D   : maximum adopting market size (in acres), 
i
t w   : price of seed type i at time t,  
i
t α   : adopting variable of seed i (output price elasticity for regular seed elasticity of  
    substitution for input-trait seed, and premium response for output-trait seed) at t, 
i
t g   : coefficient of adoption of seed i at time t,    
r   : time preference discount factor, 
β   : repeat purchase parameter, 
t  : time index, 
i  : seed type index, 
i
t z   : marketing mix ratio for seed type i at time t. 
Due to the lack of information mainly on the biotechnology-derived seeds, most of the ranges 
of data are generated given some data from different published sources (various issues of USDA-
ERS, various issues of U.S. Grains, journal articles, University extension, Internet, personal contact 
with seed consultants and dealers).   For instance, the price of the three seeds is the decision variable.  
The regular seed price ranges from $20 to $30 per acre.  The statistics on regular corn seed price per 
acre averages $25 (USDA, AREI, 1997).  The input-trait corn seed’s price differential ranges from $0 
to $20 with a minimum gross price of $25 per acre and a maximum of $45 per acre.  The output-trait 
corn seed’s price differential ranges from $0 to $18 with a minimum gross price of $25 per acre and a   11 
maximum of $43 per acre
4.  The price range of the output-trait corn seed is close to the price range 
provided by the U.S.Grains Council (1999).  This research assumes that both biotechnology-derived 
corn seeds are not priced below their respective minimum price ($25).   
The marketing mix ratio
i
t z reflects the relative non-price marketing effort of a specific seed 
firm compared to competitors’ marketing effort.  The marketing mix ratio is in terms of promotion 
mix and distribution channel of the seeds.  We model the non-price competition variable in a way that 
it shows only the relative value compared to competition within the industry.  If the relative value of 
these non-price competition variables is the same within the industry or among participants, a value 
of 1 is assigned to the marketing mix ratio.  However, if the hypothetical seed firm is less competitive 
than other participants in the industry, the ratio is assigned a value below 1.  Otherwise, a value above 
1 is a sign of competitiveness of the firm compared to the industry.  For simplicity, this ratio is 
assumed the same for the three seeds.  The main question to be addressed is how preferred seed 
pricing strategy responds when marketing effort is below, equal, or above competitors’ non-price 
marketing effort.    
  The market share variable indicates the percentage of acres allocated to seed from a given 
firm.  At each period, a market share for the next state is calculated based on current demands 
compared to adopting market size.  By introducing the biotechnology-derived corn seed, the firm 
expects to convert some of its regular seed customers as well as the potential adopters from the 
remainder of the market.  The state transition equation reflects the potential changes in a state variable 
from time t to the next period.  The potential change in quantity is captured through a market share 
state variable.  The firm evaluates the effect of pricing strategy on different state variables and the 
resulting increase or decrease of its market share from one period to the next.  Therefore, at each 
period of time, firm market share for the current period is calculated as current demand (acres) over 
the total adopting market size and is carried forward as beginning market share in the next period.  
                                                 
4 The price range of biotechnology-derived corn seeds is based of personal contacts with seed consultants and 
dealers.    12 
Due to the lack of incorporation of corn and pesticide price dynamics, this research considers a stable 
environment for output price elasticity, premium response, and elasticity of substitution variables, 
which are manually varied to detect their influence on price decisions.  It would be interesting to 
investigate the portfolio pricing effects when these variables change over time, but that is beyond the 
scope of this research. 
The benefits of each seed are incorporated in the demand model through an adopting variable.  
The adopting variable 
i
t α  represents users’ attitude toward different benefits of each seed variety 
(output price elasticity for the regular corn, the substitution effect for the input-trait seed, and the 
acreage response with respect to premium for the output-trait seed).   For the output-price elasticity, 
we generate estimates using the estimated corn acreage-corn price elasticity from Lee and 
Helmberger (1985) in the free market regime and develop a search interval for the value.  For the 
elasticity of substitution, we use the results reported by Fernadez-Cornejo (1993) and generate some 
estimates.  For premium response, at this point, no information on high oil corn acreage response with 
respect to premium paid is available.  But, as long as the acreage allocation to high-oil corn is 
trending up, we generate a range of this coefficient given the range of premium.  Note that the 
expected increase in high-oil acres is about 10% (from 1 million in 1998 to 1.2 –1.3 million acres in 
1999, U.S. Grains Council, (1999)).  The corn price used in this research is $2.50, which is close to 
$2.42, a 10-year average price, 1989-1998 (Agricultural Statistics, 1999).  Given the above 
information, we generate a range of premium response between 0.06 and 0.14.   A low premium 
implies low acreage response, low oil content, and low expected returns.  However, a high premium 
implies high acreage response, high oil content, and high-expected returns.  The coefficient of 
adoption captures the responsiveness to perceived benefits of each specific variety of corn seed.  The 
trend variable  t b  changes with perceived benefits of each seed type.    
The time frame considered in this research is 6 years.   According to Ollinger and Pope 
(1995), this is the estimated development time for new biotech seed varieties.  Furthermore,   13 
discussions with industry executives indicate the product life cycle on new corn varieties is often 
shorter than that.  Thus, the research assumes that the variables affecting farmers’ attitudes will 
remain materially stable for a while. 
Although, the analysis is built on the principle of optimization, no discovery of optimal price 
is expected within this research, but a preferred price path is observed given the assumptions of the 
model.  Furthermore, although the parameterization of the DP model, as developed in Table 2, results 
in numeric solutions, the magnitude of these solutions is fully dependent upon the assumptions.  
Therefore, interpretation of price path direction and relative prices between products is more useful 
than accepting the absolute numbers in the results.  
Table 1.  DP Model Design 
DP Search  Range  Grid Size  Note 
Decision Variables     
Price, Regular Corn  $20-$30  10  Using the midpoint approach, the range is $20.5-$29.5  
Price, Input-trait Corn  $25-$45  20  Premium range over a minimum gross price of $25 is 
$0.5-$19.5 using the midpoint approach 
Price, Output-trait Corn  $25-$43  20  Premium range over a minimum gross price of $25 is 
$0.45-$17.55 using the midpoint approach 
State Variable: Market Share     
Regular Corn  0-10%  10   
Input-trait Corn  0-8%  10   
Output-trait Corn  0-7%  10   
Specified State Variables     
Manually Varied:     
Market Mix Ratio  0.75-1.15    The model considers the following 0.8, 1.0, and 1.1 
Output Price Elasticity  0.05-0.16    The model considers the values of 0.085 and 0.095 
Substitution Effect  0.10-0.22    The model considers the values of 0.1025 and 0.1125 
Premium Response  0.06-0.14    The model considers the values of 0.096 and 0.112 
Fixed Parameters:      
Repeat  Purchase    80% 
Discount  Factor    10% 
Adopting Market Size      65 millions acres 
   14 
Analysis and Discussion 
  The focus of this section is on how managers should price a set of competing corn seeds 
within a competitive setting and short product life cycles.  A limited number of variables affecting the 
pricing strategy of the seed firm are considered (Table 1).  These different variables reflect either the 
attitude of farmers toward perceived benefits of using a particular seed variety or the degree of non-
price competitiveness of the firm within the industry.   
Based on market share variable, two scenarios are presented.  First, the seed firm does not 
have substantial market share and three seeds are simultaneously introduced as new products.  
Second, the seed firm does have substantial market share for the regular corn.  The biotechnology-
derived seeds are introduced as an extension to the regular seed.  In this case, the seed firm starts 
producing one corn seed (regular corn seed).  As market demand changes, customers request new and 
improved seed attributes.  The seed firm extends its product line with biotechnology-derived corn 
seeds (input-trait corn seed and output-trait corn seed).   
Thus, we present first the pricing strategy depending on market share condition.  Second, we 
present the impact of farmer’s attitude toward seed attributes and non-price competitive effort on the 
resulting pricing strategy.  Then, the different effects of those influencing factors are summarized in 
terms of discounted returns.      
 
Impact of beginning market share on the pricing strategy 
In the evaluation of the impact of starting market share, a lower value of output price 
elasticity, a marketing mix ratio of 1, and the repeat purchase parameter (80%) are unchanged over 
the time horizon.  Figure 1 and Figure 2 below present the single pricing time path vs. portfolio 
pricing of regular seed with respect to beginning market share of zero and beginning of market share 
of 10% for regular seed.   
Beginning market share of the firm has an impact on the pricing time paths of the seed.  
When the seeds are simultaneously introduced as new products (zero beginning market share (0.0%)),   15 
the results have indicated an increasing pricing trend (penetration strategy) for a single seed as well as 
a portfolio of competing seeds due to farmer’s learning approach.  The seed firm prices low in order 
to capture market share, and then increase it over time.  Seed price increases as market share 
increases, given a set of market conditions. (Table 2 and Table 3). 
Table 2. Single Pricing Time Path of Regular Seed with 0.0% Beginning Mkt Share, Low Output Price  
  Elasticity and Marketing Mix of 1 
  Low Output Price Elasticity 












1  20.50    16,687  463,697  480,384    1.25    814 
2  20.50    49,569  507,080  556,649    3.72  2,418 
3  20.50 113,303 438,616 551,919     8.50  5,527 
4  26.50 172,250 310,227 482,477 10.00  6,500 
5  27.50 178,750 162,500 391,250 10.00  6,500 
6  27.50  178,750    --  178,750    --  6,500 
Reg. Price refers to regular corn seed’s price.  Rt stands for Returns ($000) at time t.  rV(st+1) refers to present value of 
returns given state variable at time t+1.  V(st) is the sum of Rt and rV(st+1).   D1 stands for Regular Corn Seed Demand (000 
acres).  Ending Share1 stands for Regular seed share to be carried forward.    
 
 
Table 3. Portfolio Pricing Time Paths of Regular and Input-trait Seeds with 0.0%Beginning Mkt  
     Share, Low Output Price Elasticity and Elasticity of Substitution, and Marketing Mix of 1  
  Low Output Price Elasticity and Elasticity of Substitution 






















1  20.50  25.50  16,646  26,877  1,211,776  1.25 1.62 812  1,054 
2  20.50  25.50  49,077  79,330  1,286,306  3.68 4.79 2,394  3,111 
3  20.50  35.50  109,183  180,908  1,261,903  8.19 7.84 5,326  5,096 
4  25.50  43.50 165,750  222,111 1,070,361  10.00  7.85  6,500 5,106 
5  26.50  42.50 172,250  221,000 750,750 10.00  8.00  6,500 5,200 
6  26.50  42.50 172,250  221,000 393,250 --  --  6,500 5,200 
Reg. Price and Intrait Price refer to Regular and input-trait corn seed’s price.   R
1
t stands for Returns ($000) at time t for 
regular corn seed.  R
2
t stands for Returns ($000) at time t for input-trait corn seed.  V(st) is the sum of Rt and rV(st+1).  D1 
and D2 stand for Regular and Input-trait Corn Seed Demand (000 acres).  Ending Mkt Share 1and 2 stands for Regular and 
Input-trait seed shares to be carried forward.   16 
Figure 1 Single vs. Portfolio Pricing Paths of Regular Seed with Low Elasticity of Substitution,  
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However, with substantial beginning market share, two sets of pricing strategies are indicated 
given similar market conditions: decreasing and fixed pricing paths.   The decreasing pricing path 
(skimming strategy) consists of setting relatively high prices at the beginning, and then decreasing 
price over time given special market circumstances such as competition from within and outside the 
firm.  A fixed pricing path is based on a fixed price over time.  Decreasing and fixed pricing paths are 
mainly indicated for the existing seed given certain market conditions (Tables 4 and 5). 
Table 4  Single Pricing Time Path of Regular Seed with 10% Beginning Mkt Share, Low Output Price  
Elasticity, and Marketing Mix of 1 
  Beginning Market Share: 5.5% 












1  27.50 178,750 677,603 856,353 10.00  6,500 
2  27.50 178,750 575,613 745,363 10.00  6,500 
3  27.50 178,750 444,524 623,274 10.00  6,500 
4  27.50 178,750 310,227 488,977 10.00  6,500 
5  27.50 178,750 162,500 341,250 10.00  6,500 
6  27.50  178,750    --  178,750     --  6,500 
Reg. Price refers to regular corn seed’s price.  Rt. stands for Returns ($000) at time t.  rV(st+1) refers to present 
value of returns given state variable at time t+1.  V(st) is the sum of Rt and rV(st+1).  D1 stands for Regular Corn Seed 
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Table 5 Portfolio Pricing Time Path of Regular Seed with 10% Beginning Mkt Share and Input-trait   
Seed with 0.0% Beginning Mkt Share, Low Output Price Elasticity and Elasticity of  
Substitution, and Marketing Mix of 1 
  Low Output Price Elasticity and Elasticity of Substitution 






















1  27.50  25.50  178,750    24,913  1,563,239  10.00  1.50  6,500    977 
2  27.50  25.50  178,750    79,942  1,465,495  10.00  4.47  6,500  2,907 
3  27.50  34.50  177,017  177,986  1,332,958    9.90  7.93  6,437  5,159 
4 26.50  42.50  172,250  221,000  1,075,750  10.00  8.00  6,500  5,200 
5  26.50  42.50  172,250  221,000    750,750  10.00  8.00  6,500  5,200 
6  26.50  42.50  172,250  221,000    393,250      --    --  6,500  5,200 
Reg. Price and Intrait Price refer to Regular and input-trait corn seed’s price.   R
1
t stands for Returns ($000) at time t for 
regular corn seed.  R
2
t stands for Returns ($000) at time t for input-trait corn seed.  V(st) is the sum of Rt and rV(st+1).   
D1 and D2 stand for Regular and Input-trait Corn Seed Demand (000 acres).  Ending Share1and 2 stands for Regular and 
Input-trait seed shares to be carried forward. 
 





















Pricing strategy with respect to farmers’ attitude towards seed’s attributes 
The efficient way to identify the effect of output price elasticity is to hold the value of some 
variables unchanged and rerun the model.  The marketing mix ratio is held at a value of 1, implying 
that non-price competition effort is the same within the industry. For regular corn seed, a lower value 
of output price elasticity implies that farmers’ attitude toward corn is relatively less price sensitive 
than with a higher value of output price elasticity.  The degree of responsiveness is presented in   18 
Figure 3.  As the graph shows, the increase of seed price is faster with a higher market response than 
with a relatively lower response. 



















 A  similar trend is observed for the input-trait seed and the output-trait seed as shown in 
Figure 4 and Figure 5 respectively.  In the case of input-trait seed, a lower elasticity of substitution 
implies that the seed provides less cost saving to the farmer.  It may also be an indication of intense 
competition from pesticide producers in the sense that pesticide producers may compete by reducing 
their price in order to make the seed less valuable to farmers.  However, a higher value implies that 
pesticide is relatively more expensive and the use of input-trait corn seed provides farmers with 
relatively more cost savings. The pricing strategy implies the importance of supplying valued seeds. 




















Low Elasticity of Substitution
High Elasticity of Substitution
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   For the output-trait seed, the pricing strategy depends on the acreage response as premiums 
paid to farmers change, given a marketing mix ratio.  This acreage response coefficient is referred to 
as “premium response.”  The assumption is that when the premium paid is low, farmers may not be 
willing to allocate more acreage to output-trait seed.  But the reverse may be observed in the case that 
farmers are paid higher premiums to grow those specialty seeds.  The premium response is an 
indication of the degree of acreage response given a change in the value of premium paid.  The price 
of supplemental fats affects the premiums paid for high oil corn.  Figure 3 presents the pricing time 
paths of output-trait seed.  With a higher premium response, the price increases more rapidly than 
with a lower response.  This price trend is similar to Figure 3 related to regular seed and Figure 4 
related to input-trait seed.  


















e Low Premium Response
High Premium Response
    
Pricing strategy with respect to non-price competitive efforts 
In addition to beginning market share and farmers’ responsiveness, this research has 
emphasized the relative impact of two marketing mix variables that influence firm sales: promotion 
mix and distribution channels. Given the existing market share and the seed benefits, the different 
pricing strategies indicated earlier are affected by the degree of non-price competitive effort of the 
firm.  Depending on the degree of competitiveness of the firm relative to its competitors, the increase 
in the seed price is faster in a more non-price competitive position  (Z = 1.1) than in neutral (Z = 1) or   20 
less competitive position with Z = 0.8 (Figure 6).  The effects are the same in the case of single 
pricing as well as in the case of a portfolio of competing seeds.   
















e Marketing Mix of 1.0
Marketing Mix of 0.8
Marketing Mix of 1.1
 
  Recall that the seed firm’s objective is to maximize its discounted returns.  This objective is 
pursued through a seed diversification strategy.  By supplying more than one seed variety on the 
market, the seed firm is able to serve simultaneously several market segments.  The results indicate 
that the single product price is relatively higher than the two-seed portfolio pricing, which is in turn 
relatively higher than the three-seed portfolio pricing.  Figure 7 presents the different pricing paths of 
input-trait seed as priced as a single product as well as within either a portfolio of two or a portfolio 
of three seeds within a neutral marketing position (marketing mix ratio of 1).  A similar result is 
reported in Figures 1 and 2 for the regular corn seed.  



















e Single Pricing 
Pricing with Two Seeds
Pricing with Three seeds
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The downward shift in the portfolio pricing paths of input-trait seed as well as of the regular 
seed can be explained by the fact that there might be a complementarity relationship between these 
three seeds even though they are substitutes, as stressed in Urban’s work.  This relationship is seen 
through negative cross-price elasticities between seeds as reported in Table 6.  In case of low 
elasticities, a low pricing strategy is indicated in order to expand firm’s market share.  With high 
elasticity, the seed firm expands through high price.    
When there is substantial initial market share, evidence of negative cross-price elasticity 
between seeds is associated with low elasticities despite non-price marketing effort.  However, when 
without initial market share, there is evidence of negative cross-price elasticity between seeds only in 
the case of low responsiveness regardless of non-price competitive position.  But, there is no clear 
indication whether the negative cross-price elasticity is caused by the price change of a specific seed 
variety.  Furthermore, the construction of the objective equation provides for exponential 
incorporation of time, forcing a delay in adoption.  This delay generally models a learning curve.  
However, the slope of this curve with respect to seed technology, time and other variables is 
unknown.  Also, the general computation of cross-price elasticity does not incorporate a simultaneous 
pricing move.  But, this research does consider a simultaneous pricing strategy.  By doing so, this 
synchronized pricing move may have an impact on the results.  Consequently, it would be interesting 
to direct further investigation into the elements of the cross-price elasticity and the adoption equation.   
Table 6 Evidence of Negative Cross-Price Elasticity for Portfolio of both Two and Three Seeds   
  With Existing Market 
Share For Regular Seed 
Without Existing 
Market Share For 
Regular Seed 
Low Elasticity with Marketing mix of ratio 0.8  Yes  Yes 
Low Elasticity with Marketing mix ratio of 1.0  Yes  Yes* 
Low Elasticity with Marketing mix ratio of 1.1  Yes  Yes* 
High Elasticity with Marketing mix ratio of 0.8  No  No 
High Elasticity with Marketing mix ratio of 1.0  No  No 
High Elasticity with Marketing mix ratio of 1.1  No  No 
* Indicates that there is no change in the quantity demanded of one seed variety with respect to the price change of another 
seed variety.  This result might be explained by the fact that either the required maximum market share is fixed or there is a 
simultaneous pricing move of the seeds.    22 
Impact on the discounted returns of the seed firm 
By extending the seed line, the three portfolio scenarios present relatively higher discounted 
returns than returns in the case of single seed pricing.  Table7 summarizes the changes in the 
discounted returns from low elasticities to high elasticities under the single pricing (input-trait seed) 
vs. portfolio pricing of two seeds scenarios (regular and input-trait seeds).  These results are similar 
for single pricing as well portfolio pricing of three seeds. 
Table 7   Single Vs. Portfolio Pricing of Two Seeds: Changes in Discounted Returns From Supplying Less      
Valued To High Valued Seeds 
  Single Pricing: Change in 
Discounted Returns of Input-
trait Seed/ no Mkt share 
Portfolio Pricing: Change in 
Discounted Returns with 
Substantial Mkt Share 
Change in Discounted Returns 




























Z=0.8  651,375  799,084  22%  1,380,600  1,674,020 21.3%  945,702  1,341,486 41.8% 
Z=1.0  777,045  844,546  8%  1,563,239 1,750,528 12.0% 1,211,776 1,473,350 21.0% 
Z=1.1  804,786 862,042  7% 1,652,030  1,766,363  6.9%  1,321,712  1,517,511  14.8% 
Change is the percentage increase in discounted returns over the planned horizon from low to high seed elasticities. 
 
The discounted returns with high elasticities are higher than the results with low elasticities.  
But, portfolio returns are higher than the returns reported in the case of single seed.  Within the 
portfolio, the seed firm maximizes its returns faster when there is substantial market share of the 
existing seed (regular seed) and both seeds are simultaneously priced regardless of marketing mix 
ratio and elasticities.  However, with respect to elasticities, the discounted returns considerably 
change in the case of no existing market share for input-trait seed.  For instance, given a neutral non-
price competitive position, there is larger change in the discounted returns when both seeds are priced 
as new products (21.0%) compared to 12% with substantial market share and concurrent pricing, and 
8% in the case of single pricing of input-trait seed.  The same trend is observed with both remaining 
non-price competitive positions.  Also, the result implies that the seed firm needs a better   23 
understanding of the additional expenditures related to R&D of each seed variety in order to 
undertake improvement in seed attributes.  To improve simultaneously different attributes of both 
seeds, substantial investments are needed in all cases, but the seed firm might invest more when both 
seeds are priced as new seeds on the market.  For input-trait seed, the result can also provide an 
indication of degree of competition from pesticide side.  It may imply that any action from the 
pesticide industry has important consequences on the input-trait seeds.    
With respect to non-price marketing efforts, the discounted returns associated with low 
elasticities expect to change by  $116,577,000 with substantial market share and fixed price for 
regular seed,  $182,639,000 with substantial market share for regular seed, and $266,045,000 without 
substantial market share, respectively, when the seed firm improves its marketing position from less 
competitive to a neutral non-price competitive position.  The cost effectiveness of updating existing 
distribution channels and promotion can explain the relative small change in the discounted returns in 
the case of substantial market share compared to the discounted returns without market share.  
Analogous changes are observed when the seed firm moves from a neutral non-price competition to a 
higher non-price competitive position, but at smaller pace ($58,540,000 with some initial market 
share and fixed regular price; $88,791,000 with substantial market share and simultaneous pricing; 
and $109,936,000 without initial market share).   The discounted returns considerably change when 
the seed firm improves its marketing effort from less to more non-price competitive situation.  Thus, 
to maximize its returns, the seed firm should examine its non-price competitive situation.  These 
results are in line with Dorfman and Steiner as well as Spence, who point out the positive influence of 
non-price marketing efforts on product demand.  This result implies that it is lucrative to increase 
non-price marketing effort when the discounted returns for additional quantities (sales) are higher 
than when there is small contribution from additional sales (Ross et al., 1990).  But a further 
investigation on the cost-effectiveness of this strategy is useful.  In addition, the results indicate that a 
sustainable high pricing strategy is associated with substantial non-price competitive effort.     24 
Conclusion 
This paper has focused on pricing strategies of a set of competing seeds.  The seed portfolio 
comprises a regular corn seed and two biotechnology-derived corn seeds (with cost-lowering input-
trait and value enhanced output-trait).  Given the changes in customer’s preference, biotechnology 
techniques have played an important role in meeting customer’s needs in the seed industry.  However, 
pricing these competing seeds to generate satisfactory returns within a limited product life cycle is 
one of the problems.  This research examines the sensitivity of the pricing paths of this portfolio of 
seeds with respect to market changes using DP approach.   
The results indicate that managers should consider (incorporate) market conditions when 
setting a pricing strategy for these competing seeds.  The different market conditions incorporated in 
the DP model considerably impact the pricing paths of both single and portfolio pricing paths.  The 
analysis reveals that single and portfolio pricing time paths of competing seeds are affected by the 
firm’s initial market share, farmers’ responsiveness to perceived seed benefits, and the firm’s 
competitiveness outside and within the seed industry.  
Other things being constant, the seed firm maximizes its returns faster when it captures 
substantial market share at the time improved seeds are introduced.  For instance, for a 6-year 
planning horizon, the discounted returns associated with high elasticities are about $1,750,528 with 
substantial initial market share for regular seed versus $1,473,350 without initial market share for 
regular seed, within an equally competitive environment (Table 7).  In terms of pricing strategy, 
either a skimming or a fixed pricing strategy is indicated for the existing seed given farmers’ response 
to seed benefits and non-price marketing effort in order to maintain market share.  A penetration 
pricing strategy is indicated for new seeds being introduced. 
As the seed firm expands its product line, the single pricing path is comparatively higher than 
the portfolio-pricing path of the competing seeds as shown in Figure 5.6.  This descending trend can 
be explained by the implicit competition between seeds’ attributes despite their substitution function.  
The implicit competition is seen through negative cross-price elasticity.    25 
With respect to the non-price marketing effort, a sustainable high price is possible with a 
higher degree of non-price marketing effort.  Also, the outcomes have pointed out the substantial 
differences between being uncompetitive (marketing mix ratio of 0.8) and being either equally 
competitive (marketing mix ratio of 1.0) or substantially more competitive (marketing mix ratio of 
1.1) versus the weak differences in results between equally competitive and substantially more 
competitive.  Noting that the difference between 0.8 and 1.0 is 0.2 and the difference between 1.0 and 
1.1 is 0.1; the issue is the cost effectiveness of investing in promotion and distribution channels and 
the need to analyze carefully the particular parameters that characterize the market.   
With respect to farmers’ responsiveness to perceived benefits, this study finds that low 
elasticities generate a lower pricing trend and a slower market share expansion.  The reverse is seen in 
the case of high elasticities.   The need for strong seed benefits is reflected in the potential changes in 
the discounted returns of the seed firm.  The research findings have also revealed the substantial 
changes in the discounted returns from having farmers with lower perceived value versus higher 
perceived value in seed benefits.  Given the difference between the numbers used to represent 
farmers’ attitudes, the time value comparison of additional expenditures associated with seed 
improvement is more than necessary.  In both cases, it is not a given or a certainty that such 
investments will be beneficial.   The results have shown that farmers’ acceptance of a seed variety 
will have an impact on seed price or actions from the seed firm even though they are theoretically and 
empirically price-takers in the input markets.  Finally, an eventual action from the pesticide industry 
may have an impact on seed firm pricing strategy. 
One might argue that the fixed characteristic of the repeat purchase parameter might explain some of 
the results.  Also, the fixed nature of cost structure and adopting market share may have an impact on 
the result.  A clear knowledge of the cost structure of the seed firm would be useful in computing 
profit generated by the firm when expanding its product line.  Once the cost structure is known, the 
seed firm can easily evaluate the contribution of additional marketing expenditures or R&D 
expenditures required for seed attribute improvement.    26 
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